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FEA TURE ARTICLES
Identity Theft, Its Environment and

Proposals for Change
By Gary M. Victor*

Introduction
"Identity (ID) theft' is the use of another individual's personal
information for fraudulent purposes. 2 The ID thief typically
steals the
victim's credit in order to obtain cash, goods or services. 3 As early as
*

Mr. Victor is a sole practitioner specializing in Consumer Law and is "Of

Counsel" to Lyngklip & Taub Consumer Law Group PLC, Southfield Michigan.
Mr. Victor is also a professor in the Department of Marketing and Law in the
College of Business at Eastern Michigan University. He is a council member of the
State Bar Consumer Law Section and was selected by the council to be the second
recipient of the Frank J. Kelly Consumer Advocacy Award. He has litigated
several landmark consumer law cases and has written many articles on consumer
law and related topics.
1 For an interesting and, at times, humorous book on ID theft and other credit
issues, see Steve Weisman, 50 WAYS TO PROTECT YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR
CREDIT (Pearson Education, Inc., 2005).
2 The Federal Trade Commission defines identity theft as "a fraud committed
or attempted using the identifying information of another person without
authority." Fair Credit Reporting Act, 16 C.F.R. § 603.2(a) (2005).
3 This can be thought of as "financial" ID theft. Two other less common types
of ID theft are "criminal" ID theft-where the personal information is often used to
avoid criminal liability and "identity cloning"-where someone takes over
another's identity to establish a new life. See Identity Theft Resource Center,
Identity Theft-The Aftermath 2003. A Comprehensive Study-to Understand the
Impact of Identity Theft on Known Victims as Well as Recommendations for
Reform, 5 (Summer 2003), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/idaftermath.pdf. Terrorists
might use all three types of ID theft. See The Identify Theft Penalty Enhancement
Act: Hearing on S.2541Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Technology,
Terrorism and Government Information, 107th Cong. (2002), (statement of Dennis
M. Lorel, FBI Chief of the Terrorist Financial Review Group), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/idtheft.htm.
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1999, one author described ID theft as the "cybercrime of the
millennium, 4 while others called it the fastest growing crime in
America. Given the fact that a millennium is an awfully long period
of time coupled with our amazing ingenuity of finding novel methods
of stealing from one another, the first description might prove to be
an overstatement. There can be little doubt, however, that the second
is not.
In terms of the number of victims, ID theft is indeed the
fastest growing crime in America. A recent survey shows that in the
last two years, almost twenty million Americans became new victims
of ID theft-10.1 million in 2003 and another 9.3 million in 2004.6
Another survey indicated that eighteen percent of Americans report
themselves to be victims of ID theft.7 In addition to survey data, the
actual number of consumer ID theft complaints made to the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") has steadily increased over the last three
years to nearly 250,000 such complaints in 2004.8
One would imagine that this epidemic of ID theft would
motivate the government-with the cooperation of the business
world-to create some kind of "war on identity theft" in the same
fashion as the war on drugs. 9 In fact, efforts by the federal
4 See generally JOHN
MILLENNIUM,

Q. NEWMAN,

IDENTITY THEFT: THE CYBERCRIME OF THE

(Loompanics Unlimited, 1999); Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The

Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV. 1423 (Winter 2001).
5 See, e.g., IdentityTheft.org, Startling Facts about Identity Theft, (2005),
http://www.identitytheft.org/startling-facts.htm; Sarah Scalet, Five Ways to Stop
Identity Theft, CSO ONLINE, (March 2004), http://www.csoonline.com/
read/030104/idtheft_2286.htm.
6 See Javelin Strategy and Research, 2005 Identity Fraud Survey Report (Jan.
2005). A complementary overview of the survey can be requested from
http://www.javelinstrategy.com/reports/20051dentityFraudSurveyReport.php.
The
2003 figure is based on a reevaluation of the 9.91 million figure contained in the
2003 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) survey report: SYNOVATE &FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 7 (Sept. 2003), availableat
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf.
7 See The Experian-Gallup Organization, Personal Credit Index (2005),
http://www.personalcreditindex.com/PCISite/GallupArchiveContent.aspx?id=6.
8 CONSUMER SENTINEL, NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS IN FRAUD

& IDENTITY

2004
10
(Feb.
1,
2005),
http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/ToplOFraud2OO4.pdf
(noting that the
number of consumer ID theft complaints for the last three years were: 2002161,896; 2003-215,093; and 2004-246,570).
THEFT:

JANUARY

-DECEMBER

9 See, e.g.,
Frontline, Thirty Years of America's Drug War,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited Feb. 1,
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government, however heralded in the media,10 have been largely
cosmetic at best, and have exacerbated the ID theft problem, at worst.
In addition, Big Business continues to contribute to ID theft and has
even found ways to profit from it."1 A conspiracy theorist could
easily conclude that business and government have worked together
to place the burden of this growin2 blight on individual ID theft
victims and the public in general. 2 The absence of meaningful
institutional commitments to eliminate ID theft indicates that it is
unlikely ID theft will substantially decrease any time soon.
Unfortunately, it is much more probable that ID theft will continue to
increase steadily for the foreseeable future.
With so much visible public concern over the issue of ID
theft, the question is why society allows this problem to fester. This
article will help the reader to understand the answer to that question
by examining the environmental conditions that promote ID theft. It
will discuss how ID theft is accomplished, the effects of ID theft,
factors that contribute to ID theft and proposals for attacking the
problem.

How the ID Thief Might Steal Your Identity
ID theft can be accomplished in a myriad of ways.' 3 However,
2006) (suggesting that had such a war on ID theft been declared, it would likely
have been even less successful than the war on drugs).
10 See, e.g., Davie McGuire, Bush Signs New Identity Theft Bill, WASH. POST,
July 15, 2004, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A515952004Jul15.html (describing the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act as a
"tough new" law due to increased sentences for convicted ID thieves). See also
The White House, President Bush Signs Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act
(July 15, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/200407153.html (suggesting that the new legislation "will dramatically strengthen the fight
against identify theft and fraud").
11See Joe Light, Businesses See Profit in Fear of Identity Theft, BOSTON
Aug. 17, 2005, available at http://www.boston.com/business/
articles/2005/08/17/businessessee-profits in fear of identityjtheft/.
12 See George May, Stop ThieJ.-Are Credit Bureaus and Creditors "Silent"
GLOBE,

Co-Conspirators To Identity Theft?, 5 No. 3 J. TEX. CONSUMER L. 74 (Spring
2002), available at http://www.jtexconsumerlaw.com/TCLWebSpring2002/
pdf files/IdentityV5N3.pdf.
13 New ingenious methods of stealing personal data are developed every day.
See, e.g., Robert Vamois, USB Devices Offer and Old-School Way to Steal Data,
CD NET (Aug. 12, 2005), http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-3513_7-62965291.html?tag=nl.e501.
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there are two general approaches: the tried and true traditional
methods, and newer online methods. The traditional methods include:
1) the acquisition of lost or stolen wallets, checkbooks or credit cards;
2) theft by friends, relatives or acquaintances; 3) information
accessed as part of an offline transaction; 4) corrupt employees
misappropriating company data; 5) stolen paper mail or fraudulent
address changes; and, the perennial favorite, 6) rummaging through
garbage, or "dumpster diving." 14 The newer online methods to steal
an individual's identity can be accomplished through: 1) computer
spyware; 2) accessing information as part of an online transaction; 3)
5
creating computer viruses and hacking; and 4) sendinA "spoof"
emails posing as legitimate businesses, or "phishing". A recent
survey reports that of those ID theft victims who knew how their
information was stolen, 68.2% reported the information was stolen
using offline methods, 17 whereas the percentage for online methods

14

Javelin, supra note 6, at 7.

15A tutorial

on "spoof'

emails provided by eBay is available at
http://pages.ebay.com/education/spooftutorial (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). eBay has
been used frequently in such fraudulent emails.
16 Most readers who use email are familiar with this ever increasing problem.
This "phishing" explosion has been the subject of a great deal of literature. See,
e.g., Robert Louis B. Stevenson, Plugging the "Phishing"Hole: Legislation Versus
Technology, 2005 DUKE L. AND TECH. REv. 6, available at http://www.crimeresearch.org/analytics/phishing-duke; Federal Trade Commission, How Not to Get
Hooked by a 'Phishing' Scam, FTC FOR THE CONSUMER, June 2005,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/phishingalrt.htm.
For
additional
information, see Anti-Phishing Working Group, http://www.antiphishing.org (last
visited Jan. 26, 2006). For a good tutorial on spoof emails and fake web pages, see
Mat Bright, Spoof Email PhishingScams and Fake Web Pages or Cites, PHISHING
SCAMS
TUTORIAL
PART
1
(Feb.
23,
2004),
http://www.millersmiles.co.uk/identitytheft/gonephishing.htm. Screen captures of
spoof emails are available for viewing
at MillerSmiles
(2005),
http://www.millersmiles.co.uk/identitytheft/spoof-email-and-spoof-web-pagelibrary.htm.
17 The figures for offline ID theft methods were as follows:
Lost or stolen wallets, checkbooks or credit cards: 28.8%
Information stolen by friends, relatives or acquaintances: 11.4%
Information accessed as part of an offline transaction: 8.69%
Information stolen by corrupt employees who had access: 8.7%
Stolen mail or fraudulent changes of address: 8.0%
Information taken from garbage: 2.6%
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was only 11.6%.18 Although this data indicates the chances of ID
theft via traditional methods is far more likely, research shows that
Americans fear the Internet as a source of ID theft more than any
other source.19

There is good reason for this fear. Recently, there have been
numerous media reports of major personal information theftsinformation that can be used to commit ID theft. In February 2005,
data broker Choicepoint reported the theft of 145,000 individuals'
personal information from its system.2 0 By October of the same year
the personal information of over 50 million people had been stolen,21
the vast majority of which was accomplished though the Internet.22
Many types of institutions have been subject to such thefts. For
example, Lexis-Nexis, banks, health providers, many universities and
even the Air Force have reported such thefts.23 Undoubtedly, the
See Javelin, supra note 6, at 7. The complementary Javelin report used does not
indicate the percentage of total victims that knew how their information was stolen.
The 2003 FTC report states that fifty-one percent of those in the study who knew
how their information was stolen. See Synovate, supra note 6, at 30.
18 The figures for online ID theft methods were as follows:
Computer spyware: 5.2%
Information accessed as part of an online transaction: 2.5 1%
Computer viruses or hackers: 2.2%
Emails sent by criminals posing as legitimate business: 1.7%
See Javelin, supra note 6, at 7.
19Sixty-two percent of survey respondents are somewhat or very fearful that
their information will be stolen over the Internet. See Experian-Gallup, supra note
7. The next highest area of concern was the respondents' own mailbox, at fifty-five
percent. Id.
20 See Matt Hines, Choice Point Data Theft Widens to 145,000, CNET TECH
NEWS FIRST, Feb. 18, 2005, http://news.com.com/ChoicePoint+data+theft+
widens+to+ 145%2C000+people/2100-1029_3-5582144.html.
21 See Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches
Reported
Since
the
ChoicePoint
Incident,
(Apr.
20,
2005),
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited October 2,
2005). The actual number of people affected may be less as the personal
information of some individuals may have been contained in more than one
repository.
22 id.
Id. See also Roy Mark, Hacker Hits Air Force Database (Aug. 22, 2005),
http://www.intemetnews.com/security/article.php/3529046
The largest theft
involved forty million credit card numbers from CardSystems Solutions, Inc., a
23
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fraudulent use of even a small percentage of this personal information
would result in a dramatic increase in the Internet as a source of ID
theft information.24
In addition to providing an ever-increasing source of the
personal identifiers used to commit ID theft, the Internet is an
important tool ID thieves use to evaluate potential victims. For
example, ID thieves prefer potential victims with either good credit
or with no credit record at all. The latter 25has caused a substantial
increase in teen and college student victims.
The massive amount of personal information available on the
Internet for free or a small charge allows the ID thief to cull out
potential victims with the best characteristics. 26 As the Internet
continues to grow as the largest depository of information in the
world, it will certainly play an increasingly significant part in the ID
theft crisis.

The Effects of ID Theft
The effects of ID theft on businesses and individuals are
enormous. The total cost of ID theft was over $50 billion in each of
the last two years. 27 In 2004, the mean cost per ID theft victim was

credit card data processing company, stolen by using a computer worm. Dana
Blackenhorn,
Identity
Theft
Turning
Point?
(June
28,
2005),
http://www.corante.com/mooreslore/archives/2005/06/28/identity thefttuming-po
int.php.
24 As of August 2005, the ChoicePoint break-in data was used in "about 750
identity theft scams." Rita-Lynn Sanders, Administrators Hold Key to Lock Down
iSeries Security, ISERIES NETWORK, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.iseriesnetwork.com/
content/f3/index.cfm?fuseaction-news.viewArticle&weblD= 1001 &newslD=5021
&issuelD=5352&articlelD=51367. One of the first ID theft prosecutions resulting
from use of the ChoicePoint data involved sixteen victims and the theft of over four
million dollars. See TechNews, Identity Theft Case Filed in Los Angeles, TECH.
NEWS DAILY, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.technologynewsdaily.com/node/1369.
25 See, e.g., NewsHour Extra, Emerging Identity Theft Market Targets Teens
as Newest Niche, PBS ONLINE, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/extra/features/july-dec05/idtheft_8-29.html; Kaniqua S. Daniel, Identity
Theft Greets Incoming Freshmen, THE OAKLAND PRESS, Sept. 6, 2005, availableat
http://www.theoaklandpress.com/stories/090605/loc_2005090623.shtml;
OhioNewsNow, Kent State Warns of Identity Theft, ONN NEWS, Sept. 12, 2005,
http://www.onnnews.com/Global/story.asp?S=3832497&nav-LQ1CeNEA..
26 See May, supra note 12, at 73.
27

$51.4 Billion in 2003 and $52.6 Billion in 2004. Javelin, supra note 6, at 5.
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$5,686, and the mean out-of-pocket cost per victim was $652.2" In the
last year alone, the aggregate amount paid out-of-pocket by ID theft
victims 29 to address their individual theft problems exceeded $6
billion.

Identity theft also creates indirect monetary costs such as the
money paid by consumers to insure against such thefts.3" A 2004
that ID theft insurance is already a $2.5 billion dollar
study estimates
31
industry.

Moreover, ID theft has a significant impact on the economy in
general. For example, fear of ID theft inhibits the full utilization of
the Internet. 32 A 2000 FTC report cites a study which estimated $18
billion in lost Internet sales by 2002, due to consumer fears of
Internet privacy.33 The cost associated with investigating, arresting,
prosecuting and imprisoning ID thieves is yet another blow to the
economy.
ID theft imposes additional costs that are not readily
measurable in monetary terms. For example, the time wasted by ID
theft victims and businesses to address ID thefts is astronomical. In
the last two years, identity theft victims spent nearly 600 million
hours resolving ID theft problems not counting the time spent by
businesses. 34 Other non-monetary costs to individual ID theft victims
Id. These figures represent increases over 2003 where the mean costs were
$5,072 and $536 respectively. Id.
28

29 Id.

30 See Light, supra note 11. See also Robert Gellman, Consumers and CostsHow the Lack of Privacy Costs Consumers and Why Business Studies of Privacy
2002),
(Mar.
25-28
Incomplete
and
are
Biased
Costs
https://www.epic.org/reports/dmfprivacy.pdf.
31 CALPIRG Educational Fund, Financial Privacy in the States-How
Consumers Benefit from Personal Information Safeguards, 27 (Feb. 2004),
http://calpirg.org/reports/firiancialprivacy04.pdf.
32 See Gellman, supra note 30, at 16. Online banking has been hit particularly

hard. OUT-LAW News, Online banking growth flattens due to security fears,
OUT-LAW, July 9, 2005, http://www.out-law.com/page-6098.
33 FTC, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace 2 (2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
34 Id. This figure is based on the 10.1 million victims in 2003 multiplied by the
mean resolution time of 33 hours for that year plus the 9.3 million 2004 victims,
multiplied by the 28 hour mean resolution time for that year-a total of 593.7
million hours. Id. Slowly but surely, identity theft is starting to create a drag on the
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can be even more significant. ID theft can likewise be emotionally
devastating to its victims, 35 while at the same time damaging or
ruining their credit. 36 During the period when the ID theft victim's
credit is damaged, he or she may not be able to engage in such
normal activities as financing a car, qualifying for a mortgage,
renting an apartment or even finding a job.
Clearly, the effects of ID theft on individuals, businesses and
society are horrendous. Yet this pox on our house problem continues
to grow virtually unabated. How could this have happened?
Unfortunately, this cancer is allowed to grow more by choice than by
accident. The next section examines the forces that contribute to the
rise in ID theft and inhibit its elimination.
Forces That Contribute to ID Theft
Certainly, there are practical factors which might encourage
ID thieves and thereby contribute to the rise in ID theft. It is easier,
more profitable, requires no contact with the victim, is less likely to
result in arrest and conviction and bears a lower penalty than many
other criminal options. 38 These considerations are not the issue here.
The real issue is the economic environmental factors that promote ID
theft and inhibit its elimination, including the availability of personal
data in the information age, the ability of businesses to pass the cost
of ID theft on to the general public, the conduct of lenders and credit
bureaus, the use of social security numbers as a universal identifier
economy.
35 See Identity Theft Resource Center, Identity Theft-The Aftermath 2003:
A
Comprehensive Study-to Understand the impact of Identity Theft on Known
Victims as Well as Recommendations for Reform 35-39 (Summer 2003),
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/idaftermath.pdf.
36 See Identity Theft Resource Center, How Can You Decrease Your Risk of
Becoming
a
Victim
of
Identity
Theft?
(January,
2003),
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/html/prevention-tips.htm.
31 See Gellman, supra note 30, at 5.
38 See, e.g., Nadine Wimmer, Identity Theft Prevention, WHITE CANNON
SOFTWARE, Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.whitecanyon.com/identity-theft-preventionksl-02-2004.php (stating that "[p]olice make arrests in violent crime more than 50
in 100 cases. They make arrests in identity theft in about 1 in 700 cases"); BCS
Alliance, Identity Theft, http://www.bcsalliance.com/identitytheft.html (last visited
Feb. 4, 2006) (stating that if you commit identity theft, your odds of ever being
caught and prosecuted are about 1 in 750). See also, Sara Berg, Identity Theft:
Business
Victimization,
2
(Winter
2003),
http://www.sparsa.org/
research/IDTheft.pdf.
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and counterproductive action by the federal government. These
factors are interconnected, but will be examined separately below.
The Information Age
We are told at every turn that we live in "The Information
Age." However defined, we live in a time when the collection,
retention, purchase and sale of information is in itself a major
economic activity and a facilitator for virtually all other economic
activity.Personal
information is the "lifeblood"
of ID theft, 39 and a
conflict has developed between individual privacy and free
accessibility. Business interests embrace one side of this debate.
Privacyr advocates, consumer advocates and ID theft victims take the
other. Business interests maintain that the collection, retention,
purchase and sale of personal data should proceed unimpeded and
that whatever problems may exist are best addressed by business selfregulation rather than governmental interference. 4' Business interests
argue that the economy will benefit from this free flow of personal
information,42 and that unhindered access 43to such information will
even contribute to the reduction of ID theft.
Privacy advocates, on the other hand, argue that the
39 Emily Finch, What a Tangled Web We Weave: Identity Theft and the
Internet, in DOT.CONS: CRIME, DEVIANCE, AND IDENTITY ON THE INTERNET 86, 94

(Y. Jewkes ed., 2003), available at http://www.popcenter.org/Problems/
SupplementalMaterial/identitytheft/Finch_2003.pdf.
40 See FTC Public Workshop: Information Flows: The Costs and Benefits to
Consumers and Businesses of the Collection and Use of Consumer Information,
(June
18,
2003)
(hereinafter
"Information
Flows
Workshop"),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infoflows/030618agenda.html
41 See id.
42

See id. at 2 (testimony of Charles D. Morgan, Chief Executive Officer of

Acxiom Corporation, quoting Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan,
as follows:
The flow of information on the characteristics of customers, both
businesses and individuals, and changes in information technology in
recent years, have improved the efficiency, innovativeness and
competitiveness of our markets. This information has enabled
producers and marketers to fine-tune production schedules to the ever
greater demands of our consuming public for diversity and
individuality of products and services).
43 See id. at 6 (testimony of Laura DeSoto, Senior Vice President of Credit
Services for Experian, one of the nation's three major credit bureaus).
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unrestrained "free flow of information" is the primary cause of the
45
rise in ID theft, 44 and is not the boon that business believes it to be.
They contend that the business models that support free access to
personal data are incorrect and that the unbridled availability of
personal consumer information leads to many societal costs,
including increased ID theft. 46 They also argue that privacy and
profitability can go hand in hand. Certainly, ID theft victims
support the position that personal information should be better
protected and access to such information more restricted. 48 One thing
is certain: whatever other effects might result, if the personal
information necessary to commit ID theft was not readily available,
thefts would necessarily decrease.
While it might have been true to some extent in past
administrations, there is little doubt that during the George W. Bush
Administration the voice of business is heard louder in Washington49
than that of consumers even if presented at the same volume.
Hence, for the time being business has won this debate and personal
information remains available essentially unregulated. For less than

44 See David Algoso et al., FinancialPrivacy in the States-How Consumers
Benefit from Person Information Safeguards, CALPIRG 11 (Feb., 2004),
http://calpirg.org/reports/financialprivacy04.pdf:

Unrestrained information flow can increase a company's profits, but
makes a customer's personal information accessible to more parties.
This wide availability has made identity theft easier, and the electronic
storage of sensitive information in an increasing number of places
makes thieves difficult to track down.
45 See Information Flows Workshop, supra note 40, at 3-5 (noting written
comments of Beth Givens, Director of the Privacy Rights Clearing House
submitted as an addendum to her testimony).
46 See Gellman, supra note 30.
47

See CALPIRG, supra note 31, at 29-30.

48

See

AFTERMATH

IDENTITY

2003: A

THEFT

RESOURCE

CENTER,

IDENTITY

THEFT-THE

COMPREHENSIVE STUDY TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPACT OF

ON
KNOWN
VICTIMS
39-43
(Summer
2003),
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/idaftermath.pdf. See also, Janine Benner, Nowhere to
Turn-Victims Speak Out on Identity Theft, CALPIRG (May 2000),
http://calpirg.org/CA.asp?id2=3683&id3=CA&.
49 See, e.g., Testimony of Beth Givens, supra note 45, at 7 (complaining
of
FTC bias in that the ratio of business participants to privacy advocates at the
workshop was approximately six to one). See also Elizabeth Drew, Selling
OF
BOOKS,
June
23,
2005,
Washington, NEW
YORK
REVIEW
IDENTITY

THEFT

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18075.
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fifty dollars, information brokers will sell anyone all the personal
information necessary to commit ID theft.5 ° As long as we as a
society continue to choose the free flow of personal information over
the protection of privacy, ID theft will remain a significant part of our
lives.
Passing the Costs of ID Theft On To Consumers
As noted before, one survey reported the costs of ID theft in
2004 to be $52.6 billion, with the out-of-pocket costs to individual
victims constituting only $6 billion of that amount. 51 This means that
business losses from ID theft were over $46 billion in just the last
year. If these amounts represented "true" losses, major creditors and
other businesses that "suffered" these losses would be screaming
bloody murder to have an end put to ID theft. Instead, it is consumer
and privacy groups that are pushing for ID theft prevention. Why is
that? The answer is simple. Consumers rather than businesses
actually suffer these losses.
Consumers shoulder these
52 losses because businesses can pass
the cost of ID theft on to them.
Consumers bear the brunt of financial losses incurred by
corporate identity thefts through higher costs for products and
services. The costs of check fraud-losses, legal fees, increased
insurance premiums, and higher banking costs are often if not always
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher interest rates and
other financial institution fees.53
Instead of extending credit cautiously in light of the high
incidence of ID theft, there has been a virtual explosion of credit
offers. 54 This ability to pass on the costs of ID theft contributes to the
See,
e.g.,
Background
Searcher,
The
Truth
Is
Here,
http://www.backgroundsearcher.us (last visited Mar. 2, 2006); Public Records
Search, Access Almost Any Public Record, http://www.records-search.net (last
visited Mar. 2, 2006).
51 See Javelin, supra note 6, at 1.
52 See
BCS Alliance,
Identity Theft, http://www.bcsalliance.com/
50

identitytheft.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
53 Information Security Newsletter, "Corporate" Identity Theft: A New Twist
(Michigan State University, Theft Partnerships for Prevention, School of Criminal
Justice), Jan. 15, 2002, http://www.cj.msu.edu/%7Eoutreach/identity/news4.html.
See also, Sara Berg, Identity Theft: Business Victimization, ENTERPRISE SECURITY
6 (Winter 2003), availableat http://www.sparsa.org/research/IDTheft.pdf.
54 See Bob Sullivan, Deluged with Credit Card Mail? Help is Coming,

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

credit offerings we annoyingly find in our mailboxes nearly every
day.
The credit card industry is a prime example of this situation.
Credit card fraud associated with the fraudulent use of existing credit
card accounts or the creation of new credit card accounts is the most
common type of ID theft. 55 Yet, credit card offers abound and credit
56
is all too often granted with inadequate proof of identity.
Competition in the credit card industry is fierce. Lenders believe they
cannot reduce their competitive zeal simply because they engage in a
risky business. To offset these risks-one of which is ID theft-they
simply raise their interest rates and fees. 57 By paying these higher
interest rates and fees, you and I, rather than the credit card
companies, pay the cost of ID theft.
Many of the proposals for reducing ID theft require lenders to
be more careful when extending credit. As long as creditors can
pass the bulk of ID theft cost on to the public, they have little
incentive to advocate enacting such proposals into law.59 For them,
ID theft is simply a cost of doing business that can be passed on
without decreasing profitability. Until the costs of ID theft are so high
they cannot be passed on-until the public rejects credit cards
MSNBC, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id!8827007/ (citing one
survey that estimated that 1.4 billion credit card solicitations were sent out in the
first quarter of 2005).
See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY
REPORT 10 (Sept. 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf.
55

See Liz Pulliam Weston, Blame Lenders, not Thieves, for Identity Theft,
MSN MONEY, March 2005, http://moneycentral.msn.com/contentiBanking/
FinancialPrivacy/P48173.asp.
5' Ryan Kim, Why Credit Card Rates are Rising-Banks Use Lots of Reasons
56

for

Increasing Interest, SFGATE,

July

28,

2005,

http://sfgate.com/cgi-

bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/07/28/BUG8RDUGKV 1.DTL&type=b
usiness.
's See, e.g., PIRGIM, Michigan Detectives: Identity Theft on the Rise-New
Laws, Resources Needed to Deter Identity Theft, Feb. 4, 2004,
http://pirgim.orgiMI.asp?id2= 12099&id3=MI&
(stating that
the primary
recommendation was to require credit card companies and other credit grantors to
tighten security before granting credit). The full PIRGIM report is available at
http://pirgim.org/reports/policingprivacy04.pdf.
59 See BCS Alliance.com, supra note 52:
The problem with identity theft is that much of it could easily be
prevented if Congress would pass laws requiring lenders and sellers to
thoroughly verify each and every credit application, but if the did so, it
would cost the banking industry billions, so they don't require them to.
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because the interest rates and fees are too high-ID theft will
continue to prosper. That point in time, should it ever come, lies
beyond the immediate horizon.
Lenders and Credit Bureaus
Credit reporting agencies ("CRAs"), commonly referred to as
credit bureaus, were created to assist lenders in assessing the credit
worthiness of potential borrowers. 60 Over the years, both the
availability of consumer credit and the personal information
maintained by CRAs has risen exponentially. The development of
these industries, lenders and CRAs 62 have facilitated the rise in ID
theft.63

Some place the primary blame on lenders for extending credit
"with only a cursory validation that the person requesting credit is
truly who he or she purports to be." 64 Others include CRAs as a
principle culprit. Certainly, there is hyperbole in such statements as
60 For a history of the credit reporting industry in America, see Robert M.
Hunt, A Century of Credit Reporting in America, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.,
Working Paper No. 05-13, 2005), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/
files/wps/2005/wpO5-13.pdf. See also FTC PreparedStatement on the FairCredit
Reporting Act Before the Fin. Inst. And Consumer Credit Subcomm. of the House
Fin. Serv. Comm. (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/
030604fcratestimony.pdf [hereinafter PREPARED STATEMENT].
61 See Hunt, supranote 60, at 2:

In 2002, Americans held more than 1.5 billion credit cards, used them
to spend $1.6 trillion, and maintained balances in excess of $750
billion. Information provided by credit bureaus us an important
ingredient in the vast expansion of unsecured consumer credit in the
U.S. over the last century.
62 Id. at 16-17. Today in America there are three major credit bureaus:
Equifax, Experian and TransUnion. There are less than 1,000 smaller credit bureaus
and a number of specialty credit bureaus dealing with such issues as landlordtenant and employment. Id. at 16-17. Almost all of these smaller or specialty credit
bureaus get their information from the big three. Id. at 16-17.
63 See Weston, supra note 56; NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 11-15 (discussing
credit bureaus as "Partners in Identity Theft").
64 Mark Peters, Proposalto Reduce Identity Theft with PersonalIdentification
Numbers, EPiNIONS, Aug. 8, 2003, http://www.epinions.com/content_3442778244.
See also Weston, supra note 57; Mike Lee & Brian Hitchen, Identity Theft-The
Real Cause, IT OBSERVER, May 24, 2004, http://www.ebcvg.con/
articles.php?id=217.
65 See NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 11-15.
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it is the ID thieves that actually commit the crimes. It is true,
however, that the individual behavior of creditors and CRAs, as well
as the interrelationship of these two forces, facilitate ID theft. Even
assuming their intentions are entirely innocent, creditors and CRAs
facilitate ID theft both before and after the fact. 66
In addition to contributing to ID theft by sending out billions
of unsolicited credit offers6 7 and by using careless credit granting
procedures, creditors also contribute to ID theft by ignoring fraud
alerts on consumers' credit reports and failing to cooperate with law
enforcement attempts to investigate the crime. 68 The Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 ("FACTA") 69 modified the
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"),7 ° which regulates CRAs, by
adding new sections and changing some of the existing provisions.
One new provision allows identity theft victims to notify one CRA
and have all three major CRAs put a "fraud alert" on their credit

See Benner, supra note 48, Nowhere to Turn-Victims Speak Out on
Identity Theft, CALPIRG 10 (May 2000), http://calpirg.org/CA.asp?id2=
3683&id3=CA&:
66

Yet, much more needs to be done to stop identity theft. In particular,
legislation must be enacted to require creditors and credit bureaus to
improve their credit-granting and complaint-handling practices.
Further, easy access to the bits of information that comprise a
consumer's financial identity must be curtailed. Sloppy credit-granting
practices by banks, department stores, phone services, and other
creditors make the crime all too easy to commit. Once the crime has
occurred, creditor and credit bureau practices help perpetuate the
problem by subjecting victims to a nightmarish system of clearing their
names, making victims into repeat victims, or both.
67 See Bob Sullivan, Deluged with Credit Card Mail? Help is Coming,
MSNBC, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8827007/ (estimating that
1.4 billion credit card solicitations were sent out in the first quarter of 2005).
68 See Weston, supra note 56.
69

Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159

(2003).
70

15 U.S.C. § 1681 etseq.

71 See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, FACTA, The Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act: Consumers Win Some and Lose Some (2005),
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm#1; NCLC, Analysis of the Fair and
Accurate
Credit
Transactions
Act
of
2003,
http://www.nclc.org/
initiatives/facta/contents/nclcanalysis-content.html#1#1
(last visited Feb. 4,
2006).
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reports.7 2 Linda Foley, Executive Director of the Identity Theft
Resource Center, contends that creditors are ignoring these fraud
alerts because they claim it is too expensive to contact consumers to
verify credit applications.7 3 Creditors fail to cooperate with law
enforcement in a number of ways. A study of law enforcement's
response to ID theft reports investigators as saying they regularly
encountered lenders who failed to return police calls, refused to
provide copies of credit applications and even ignored some search
warrants. 74
There are several other more insidious ways in which
creditors might contribute to ID theft. One is to knowingly report
fraudulent information to the CRAs as genuine.75 Creditors are aware
that negative information on a credit report, even if inaccurate, might
well force the innocent party to pay the fraudulent debt.76 Another
disreputable practice is for creditors to sell ID theft debts to debt
collectors. A provision of FACTA prohibits such sales, 77 but
consumers have no private right to sue for a violation under this
provision, and there is no evidence that creditors will abide by it.
Whether through greed, negligence or willful misconduct, creditors
continue to facilitate ID theft. Until the losses from such behavior
exceed the potential profits, creditors will remain one of the principal
contributors to ID theft.
78
CRAs have been referred to as "partners in identity theft.,
There are three major CRAs in the United States: Experian, Equifax

72

73
74

LAW

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(q)(3).
See Weston, supra note 56.
JENNETTE GAYER, CALPIRG
ENFORCEMENT'S

RESPONSE

EDUCATIONAL FUND, POLICING PRIVACY:

TO

IDENTITY

THEFT

9-10

(2003),

http://calpirg.org/reports/policingprivacy2003.pdf.
75 Creditors who provide information to credit bureaus are known as
"furnishers." See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(6). Prior to the 1996 amendments to the
FCRA, furnishers could not be sued under the act by consumers for providing
inaccurate information to credit bureaus. Even after the changes, furnisher litigation
is still uncommon. Unscrupulous creditors are willing to take the chance the
innocent "debtor" will pay to clean up their credit rather than sue.
76 See Sullivan v. Equifax, Inc., No. CIV. A. 01-4336, 2002 WL 799856, at
*3-4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2002) (referencing Rivera v. Bank One, 145 F.R.D. 614,
622-23 (1993); Matter of Sommersdorf 139 B.R. 700, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1991)).
77 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(f).
78 See NEWMAN, supra note 4. See also Hoar, supra note 4.
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and TransUnion. 79 Functionally, these three economic giants control
the credit of all Americans as well as the citizens of many other
countries.8 0 If there is any "big three" left in this country, it is the
CRAs, not the automobile companies.
The principal contribution of CRAs to ID theft is personal
information. The amount of this information in the hands of CRAs is
81
almost beyond comprehension. For example, in Sarver v. Experian,
the Court noted:
The affidavit of David Browne, Experian's compliance
manager, explains that the company gathers credit
information originated by approximately 40,000 sources.
The information is stored in a complex system of national
databases, containing approximately 200 million names and
addresses and some 2.6 billion trade lines, which include
information about consumer accounts, judgments, etc. The
company processes 82
over 50 million updates to trade
information each day.
One would hope that with all this personal information, the
accuracy of credit reports 83 would be a paramount consideration.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. In credit reporting, speed, rather
than accuracy, rules. A 2003 study 84 discovered that seventy-nine
percent of all credit reports contain some type of error, and twentyfive percent contain such serious errors that those individuals could
be denied credit. 85 By failing to put procedures in place to assure that
the information in their files is accurate, and by continuing to

79

See Hunt, supra note 60. See also PREPARED STATEMENT, supra note

80

See Hunt, supranote 60.

81

Sarver v. Experian, 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2004).

60.

82 id,
83

For information about credit reports generally, see Privacy Rights

Clearinghouse, How Private is My Credit Report?, (Nov. 1992, revised Feb. 2006),
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6-crdt.htm# 1.
84 U.S. PIRG, MISTAKES Do HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN CONSUMER
CREDIT
REPORTS
(June
2004),
available
at
http://uspirg.org/
reports/MistakesDoHappen2004.pdf.
85 Id. at 4. See also Ray Martin, Four out of Five Credit Reports Have Errors,
CBS
NEWS,
Oct.
13,
2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/10/12/earlyshow/contributors/raymartin/main648887.shtml.
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circulate erroneous information-some of which is the result of
identity theft-CRAs make it more difficult to both discover ID theft,
as well as to enable victims to reestablish their credit.
CRAs are regulated under the FCRA.86 The FCRA requires
that third parties have a "permissible purpose" in order to obtain a
credit report.8 7 To comply with this requirement, CRAs must
maintain reasonable procedures designed to assure that only those
with proper purposes are permitted to acquire credit reports. 88 If these
procedures are lax it is may be possible for ID thieves to obtain credit
reports containing all the information necessary for the crime. More
often the fault is not with lax procedures on the part of CRAs, but
with dishonorable employees of CRA subscribers. " However, more
rigorous procedures on the part of both subscribers and CRAs could
diminish this problem.
More important, perhaps, is the exception to the "permissible
purpose" rule permitted for affiliate sharing. Affiliate sharing allows
the CRAs and their subscribers to share personal consumer
information with related corporations. 90 An FCRA amendment 91
added by the FACTA limits an affiliate's use of consumer
information unless the consumer is given an opportunity to opt-out of
such use. 92 Few consumers choose to opt-out. 93 Affiliates in
86

87

Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 etseq. (2005).
Generally, reports may be provided for the purposes of making decisions

involving credit, insurance, or employment. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3) (2005).
Consumer reporting agencies may also provide reports to persons who have a
"legitimate business need" for the information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F). The
legitimate business need requires that the transaction be initiated by the consumer.
15 U.S.C. § 168 lb(a)(3)(F)(i).
88 15 U,S,C. § 1681e(a). See also, FTC Official Staff Commentary § 607 Item
@G, item 2A. One large reporting agency, TRW, asserts it conducts both
precautionary and investigative activities on the uses to which its clients put the
reports. Klapper v. Shapiro, 154 Misc, 2d 459; 586 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1992).
89 See, e.g., Graves v. Tubb, 281 F. Supp. 2d 886 (N.D. Miss. 2003) (where an
employee used his position to obtain credit information on his ex-wife and her new
husband); Del Amora v. Metro Ford Sales and Service, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 947
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (where an employee obtained credit information about his brotherin-law while his sister's divorce was pending).
90 See generally Barbara M. Mishkin, FairCredit Reporting Act Amendments:
Affiliate Sharing, REED SMITH, Mar. 10, 2004, http://www.reedsmith.com/library/
searchlibrary.cfln?FaAreal =CustomWidgets.contentview_1 &citid=3623.
91 15 U.S.C. § 168 1s-3(a).
92

See Mishkin, supra note 90.
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possession of sensitive personal information
obtained from the CRAs
94
are often used as sources by ID thieves.
It may well be that the greatest contribution CRAs have made
to the rise of ID theft in this country is through the sale of "header"
information. 95 Credit "header" information includes such personal
identifying items as the consumer's name, address, telephone
number, date of birth and social security number. 96 It does not
include credit history items. Starting in the 1990s, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), which is charged with regulating CRAs, held
that "header" information could be sold outside the restrictions of the
FCRA. 97 Given the green light, the CRAs-each with hundreds of
millions of personal information files-began selling this information
to data brokers, marketing firms, financial institutions and anyone
else willing to pay for it. This information rests in the computers of
those who purchased it, ready to be stolen or purchased by ID
thieves.
In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
("GLBA"), 98 which contains a number of provisions designed to
protect the privacy of nonpublic personal information at financial and
financial-related institutions.99 Pursuant to the GLBA, the FTC
formulated a regulation which would restrict CRAs' sale of "header"

Privacy advocates, consumer advocates and ID theft victims argue that an
opt-in system for the use of information by affiliates would substantially reduce ID
theft. Businesses, of course, prefer opt-out. For a discussion of the two systems
see Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal
Informationfrom CommercialInterests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 1457, 1494-1501 (2001) (discussing the relative merits of opt-in and opt-out
systems to sensitive personal information collected by commercial entities),
available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF/BigBrother.pdf.
94 The data brokers and financial institutions that have been subject to data
breaches are often affiliates of CRAs.
95 See Jeanne Sahadi, Your Identityfor Sale: From Credit Bureaus to Grocers
to Unscrupulous Brokers, There's a Healthy Trade in Your Good Name, CNN
MONEY, May 9, 2005,http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/09/pf/security-info profit/.
96 Privacy Rights Clearing House, Federal Reserve Board "Credit Header"
93

Comments, Jan. 30, 1997, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fedres.htm.
97 See USPIRG, Letter Endorsing Nelson Markey Proposals Regulating
Information
Brokers
1
(Mar.
8,
2005),
http://www.pirg.org/
consumer/pdfs/pirgendorsesnelsonmarkey.pdf.
98 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. (2000).
99 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809.
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information.'l° TransUnion, one of the big three CRAs sued the FTC
to prevent the implementation of the new regulation."l ' In 2002, the
Federal Court of Appeals held that the regulation was valid. 102 Hence,
subsequent to 2002, CRAs are no longer allowed to sell "header"
information without giving the consumer an opportunity to opt-out of
such sales.' 0 3 Although this may have somewhat reduced the sale of
"header" information, it has far from eliminated the practice. As long
as CRAs continue to collect, retain and sell our personal information,
ID theft will continue to grow.
Social Security Numbers As Universal Personal Identifiers
Perhaps, the real key to ID theft'0 4 is the use of the social
security number ("SSN") as a universal personal identifier. 10 5 None
of the factors already considered-the profusion of personal
information offered for sale by data brokers, the behavior of lenders
in their zeal to sell their "products" and the huge deposits of personal
information housed at CRAs--could have the impact on ID theft they
do if our country stopped using SSNs as a universal personal
identifier. 10 6 Support for this proposition is apparent by the fact that
1oo See TransUnion v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
10 Id. at 50.
102

Id. at 53.

103

15 U.S.C. § 6802(b).

104

See Harry A. Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for

Sound Internet Safety Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 4-6, available at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/04_STLR_2/.
See also Eileen Ambrose,
Secure Number is Key to Privacy, Sun-Sentinal, Sept. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/sns-yourmoney0901 security,0,5347909.story?coll=sfl-yourmoney. Social Security Administration,
Identity Theft and Your
Social Security
Number (Feb. 2004),
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10064.pdf.
105 The social security number itself provides certain information about where
you were born and your approximate age. Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, Structure of Social Security Numbers, May 15, 2001,
http://www.cpsr.org/prevsite/cpsr/privacy/ssn/ssn.structure.html.
106 See U.S. Public Interest Research Group Before the Subcommittee on
Social Security of the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 108th Congress (June 15,
2004),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=printfriendly&id= 1648#_
ednrefl (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S.
Public Interest Research Group).
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other modem countries that do not use a universal personal07identifier
such as our SSNs have a much lower incidence of ID theft. 1
08
Proposals have been made for legislation protecting SSNs
and for a new, safer identity system.10 9 The FACTA did give
consumers a modicum of protection by permitting them to request
that their SSNs be truncated when CRAs send out their credit reports
(only the last four numbers sent)." With this exception, there are
few laws regulating the use of SSNs by businesses. Unless we find
some way of effectively protecting SSNs, or better yet, develop a
personal identity system less amenable to abuse, ID theft will
continue to plague our society.
Counterproductive Action By the Federal Government
As previously discussed, pressure to remedy ID theft comes
from consumer groups, privacy advocates and victims. Big Business,
on the other hand, is more interested in making sure it can pass the
cost of ID theft on to the public and/or profit from it.111 Given these
circumstances, it would be unreasonable to expect the federal
government, especially during the George W. Bush Administration,
to attack the real causes of ID theft. True to those expectations, the
federal government has done little to remedy the environmental
factors that have contributed to the rise in ID theft. In fact, many of
the laws passed during the Bush Administration have done more to
107

See Liz Pulliam Weston, What Europe Can Teach Us About Identity Theft,

MSN
MONEY,
June
2,
2005,
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/
Banking/FinancialPrivacy/P 116528.asp.
108 Id. See also The Orator, H.R. 220, The Identity Theft
Prevention Act of
2005 (Proposed), http://www.theorator.com/bills109hr220.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2006).
109 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?, 54
L.J. 1277 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=386881 (The
author proposes a pubic identity system arguing that because most identity
impersonations take place in private transactions, the decrease in public identities
over the last three decades coupled with the increase in privacy has provided an
environment within which identity thieves can operate.)
110 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 g(a) (2005).
HASTINGS

1" The most common way lenders profit from ID theft is by selling ID theft
insurance. See e.g., Laura Bruce, Is Identity Theft Protection Worth the Money?,
BANKRATE,
Aug.
4,
2004,
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/advice/
scams/20040804al.asp; David Simons, ID Theft Insurance Isn't Insurance,
FORBES,
May
29,
2003,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/
05/29/cx ds_0529simons.html.
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exacerbate the problem than correct it.
One example is the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005. 12 In the usual legislative
"doublespeak" ' 1 3 from this era this bill neither prevents bankruptcy
abuse nor protects consumers. 114 Some argue that this bill was bought
and paid for by the banking, credit card and retail industries who
"gave more than $56 million to political parties and candidates in the
2004 elections.""1 5 These businesses had been pressing for
"bankruptcy reform" for several years, and it became one of their
principal legislative targets after the increase in Congress's
Republican majority in 2004.116
Essentially, this legislation, which took effect in October of
2005, makes it more difficult for individuals to declare bankruptcy
without paying back some of their debts. It does not close loopholes7
for businesses or wealthy individuals that declare bankruptcy."
Democrats tried to pass amendments limiting the impact of the bill on
the most vulnerable consumers11 8 noting, for example, that about
one-half of all bankruptcies are the result of medical problems." 9 All
For a discussion of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer
Protection Act, see Compact Library Publishers, Inc., Comprehensive Summary of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, http://ws5.com/bankruptcy (last updated May
17, 2005).
13 Legislation passed during the George W. Bush Administration
usually has
Under
Clear
Molly
Ivins,
their
effects.
See
with
entirely
inconsistent
names that are
Skies, Alternet, Sept. 19, 2003, http://www.altemet.org/story/16807/.
114 See, e.g., Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, How a Bad Bill Becomes
112

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi2005,
13,
Mar.
SFGATE,
Law,
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/03/13/EDGSMAPC9G 1.DTL; Martin
H. Bosworth, Congress Passes Bankruptcy Reform Bill-Measure Rewards
Financial Industry at Consumer's Expense, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Apr. 14, 2005,

http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/bankruptcy-act01 .html.
115Kathleen Day, Senate Passes Bill To Restrict Bankruptcy Credit Card
Business Backed Measure to Collect More Debt, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2005,
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24940available
See also Open Secrets, Tracking the Payback-Finance:
2005MarlO.html.
Bankruptcy Reform (April 15, 2005), http://www.opensecrets.org/payback/
issue.asp?issueid=BA3&CongNo = 109.
116 See Open Secrets, supra note 115.
117

See Hunter, The Bankruptcy Bill, Examined, DAILY Kos, Mar. 6, 2005,

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/3/6/63144/06015.
118 Id.
119See David U. Himmelstein, et. al, Marketwatch: Illness and Injury as
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of these amendments, including one specifically designed to protect
individuals forced into bankruptcy as a result of ID theft, were
defeated. 120 It is interesting to note that shortly after the Hurricane
Katrina catastrophe, Democrats indicated an intention to introduce a
bill to shield Katrina victims from the effects of the new bill. 12 1 As of
this writing, it remains to be seen whether lenders will have the
power to keep Congress from protecting these unfortunate
individuals.
Part of the ID theft problem noted above results from lenders
being able to pass the cost of ID theft on to the general public as well
122
as their flooding the market with billions of credit card offers,
some of which end up in the hands of ID thieves. Rather than
discouraging these behaviors, the bankruptcy "reform" bill will
enable lenders to pass on even higher ID theft costs and will do
nothing to restrain them from deluging us with never-ending waves
of unsolicited credit card offers.
The FACTA, 123 mentioned above, is another example of
counterproductive legislation. Although it is certainly true that the
FACTA contains provisions that may benefit ID theft victims, 124 it is
also a bill "written to protect the financial industry in this country.' 25
The preemption provisions of the FACTA are prime examples of
counterproductive federal action.
Contributors

to

Bankruptcy,

HEALTHWATCH.ORG,

Feb.

2,

2005,

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w5.63/DC 1. See also and
listen to Patricia Neighmond, Study Shows that Medical Bills Spur Slew of Personal
Bankruptcies,
NPR,
Feb.
2,
2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=4475013.
120 See Hunter, supra note 117.
121

See, e.g., Martin Bosworth, Congress May Modify Bankruptcy Reform that

Penalizes

Katrina

Victims,

CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM,

Sept.

5,

2005,

http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/katrina-bankruptcy.html;
Loren
Steffy, Law to Deal Second Blow to Victims of Hurricane,Hous. CHRON., Sept. 8,
2005, availableat http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/business/334587 1.
122 One survey estimated that 1.4 billion credit card solicitations were sent out
in the first quarter of 2005. Bob Sullivan, Deluged with Credit Card Mail? Help is
Coming, MSNBC, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8827007/.
123 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159
117 Stat. 1952 (2003). See also National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), Analysis
of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159
(2003), http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/facta/nclc-analysis.shtml.
121 WEISMAN, supra note 1, at 169-182 (Pearson Education, Inc., 2005).
125

Id. at 170.
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When the FCRA was originally enacted in 1970, states were
free to enact laws giving consumers more protections than those
contained in the FCRA. 1-Amendments to the FCRA in 1996, with a
few exceptions, established federal preemption preventing states from
passing laws with greater restrictions on business than those
contained in the FCRA. 127 These preemption provisions were set to
expire in 2004.128 The impetus for the FACTA was the desire of the
financial industry to continue and expand the preemption of stronger
state laws rather than any governmental mission to combat ID theft or
protect its victims.1 29 Since the bill had to be passed prior to the 2004
preemption expiration, the financial backers were willing to make
some concessions to consumers in order to get the bill passed in
time. 13 0
Many commentators concede that whatever good the FACTA
has delivered-such as one free credit report per year from each of
the big three CRAs, 13 1 and the ability of ID theft victims to put fraud
alerts on their credit reports1 32 -was obtained at a high price.' 3 3 For
See Michael Epshteyn, The Fair and Accurate Credit TransactionsAct of
2003: Will Preemption of State CreditReporting Laws Harm Consumers?, 93 GEO.
L.J. 1143, 1154 (2005).
126

127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130

See Weisman, supra note 1, at 169-70.

131

16 C.F.R. §§ 610.1-610.3.

132

Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 168 1a(q)(3) (2005).

133

See Epshteyn, supra note 126, at 1164-65:

Congress took important and much-needed steps to strengthen the
FCRA when it passed the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of
2003, and consumers should applaud the additional rights they have
gained under this new legislation. These rights, however, have come at
a high price, because states may no longer be able to effectively protect
their citizens from unforeseen credit reporting dangers, and, as the
growing practice of identity theft demonstrates, new threats may well
lurk right around the comer. Implementing baseline national standards,
while granting the states flexibility to legislate in this dynamic and
unpredictable domain, would likely have been the best means of
improving our credit system while simultaneously strengthening
consumer protections. Congress's failure to adopt this approach may
ultimately serve to undermine consumer privacy and financial security,
although only time can tell whether the dire consequences of
preemption forecasted by this Note will ever come to pass.
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example, under the FACTA, consumers were given the new benefit
of the ability to opt out of affiliate sharing, orwhich is the practice of
34
CRAs sharing their personal information with related companies.'
At the same time, the FACTA preempted any state laws that would
further restrict affiliate sharing.' 35 California had enacted a statute
with stronger affiliate sharing restrictions than those contained in the
FCRA. 136 In June 2005, in American Bankers Association v.
Gould,137 the Federal Court of Appeals struck down the California
statute as preempted by the weaker FCRA. 1 38 Many of the states that
have enacted or are considering laws addressing ID theft will find
their efforts futile as a result of the FACTA preemptions.
With several of its new "protections" offered to ID theft
victims, the FACTA compounds its preemption with the absence of a
private right of action-the ability of individuals to sue if they have
been injured by a violation of the FCRA. Without a capacity to sue
for its breach, any new alleged "benefit" is functionally no benefit at
all. For example, the FACTA requires that furnishers of information
to CRAs maintain reasonable procedures to assure that they do not
refurnish information to the CRAs once they are notified that the
information is the result of ID theft. 139 This provision helps ID theft
victims clear up their credit by preventing the erroneous information
from reappearing on future credit reports. Therefore, if a credit card
company has inadequate procedures in place and refurnishes ID theft
information to the CRAs, the ID theft victim cannot sue for this
breach 40 and states are preempted 14from
enacting laws that would
1
give ID theft victims the right to sue.
Another piece of federal legislation that is at best cosmetic
and could prove counterproductive is the Identity Theft Penalty
See also Privacy Rights Clearing House, FACTA, The Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act: Consumers Win Some, Lose Some (Apr. 2005),

http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm; NCLC, supra note 123.
134 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(H). See generally Mishkin, supra note 90.
...15 U.S.C. § 1681s-3.
136 California Financial Information Privacy Act, CAL. FIN. CODE § 4050-60
(2004).
137

Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005).

"' Id. at 1087.
139

Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 s-2(a)(6)(A) (2005).

140

15 U.S.C. § 1623(a)(6)(B).

141 15 U.S.C § 1623(c).
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Enhancement Act ("ITPEA"). 14 2 Passed with much fanfare, the
ITPEA increases the penalty for certain ID theft crimes by two years
and terrorism using false IDs by five years. 143 Increasing the penalty
for a particular crime will have the desired effect of reducing that
crime only if the criminal is thinking logically 144 and the increased
penalty makes the rewards of committing the crime unattractive.
Since ID theft can be quite lucrative and the chance of getting caught
is about seven hundred to one, 145 the ITPEA is unlikely to
significantly deter ID theft; whatever kudos Congress and the
President might have received for its passage. Moreover, the ITPEA
might have a negative effect on the prevention of ID theft by lulling
the public into a belief that the government is doing something about
the problem. Consumers could thus be less inclined to demand real
remedies and less vigilant regarding their personal data.
There are still other examples of federal government action
that failed to address the real causes of the ID theft crisis and/or made
the problem worse. Be that as it may, only a dramatic and immediate
change can reverse the rising trend of ID theft.
Proposals for Changing the ID Theft Environment
Overview
In 2003, LexisNexis released a study of ID theft conducted 4in6
conjunction with the Economic Crime Institute of Utica College.'
142

Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3010 (1998).

See, e.g., David McGuire, Bush Signs New Identity Theft Bill, WASH.
July
15,
2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpPOST.COM,
dyn/articles/A51595-2004Jul 15.html; Press Release, The White House, President
Bush Signs Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act (July 15, 2004),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040715-3.html.
144 For example, the terrorists that flew their high-jacked planes into the World
143

Trade Center and the Pentagon, several of whom were in the possession of false
identifications, would hardly be deterred by the fact that their crime bore the
possibility of five extra years in prison.
145 See Wimmer, supra note 38 (noting that "[p]olice make arrests in violent
crime more than 50 in 100 cases. They make arrests in identity theft in about 1 in
700 cases."); BCS Alliance, Identity Theft, http://www.bcsalliance.com/
identitytheft.html (stating that ". . .if you commit identity theft, your odds of ever
being caught and prosecuted are about 1 in 750") (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
146
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Analyzing the ID theft problem, the study noted that: "Identity fraud
has become a national and global problem. Once a problem has risen
to that level, the government must take a central role in providing the
leadership to help solve it.' ' 14 7 Hence, the study's first
recommendation was "a commitment from the highest levels of
federal government to lead and fund a national strategy to combat the
identity fraud problem."' 148 This recommendation would require the
federal government to sever its commitment to protecting the
interests of Big Business and focus on changing the environmental
factors that foster ID theft. Big Business believes that maintaining the
environmental factors as they are is in its best financial interest.
Therefore, it will resist any attempts by the federal government to
enact legislation regulating those factors even though that is the only
way of actually reducing ID theft. Such resistance cannot be
permitted to rule the day.
In his 2003 testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions, Edmund Mierzwinski, Executive Director
of the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, made this point quite
clear:
Legislation is necessary to coerce these recalcitrant firms,
which generally consider a "few" mistakes and a few
lawsuit settlements the cost of doing business while they
ignore the real costs, both tangible and intangible, to
victims. Unless banks, department stores and credit bureaus
are forced by law to help prevent identity theft, they will
continue in their sloppy credit-granting practices, they will
continue to dismiss the problem of identity theft with their
public relations campaigns and they will continue to reject
the massive
impact identity theft has on its consumer
149
victims.
There have been many proposals for legislation addressing ID
theft, and many more will come over time. The proposals that follow
THREAT

(October

2003),

http://www.verilaw.com/presscenter/hottopics/

ECIREPORTFinal.pdf
147 Id at 40.
148 Id.

See ConcerningAffiliate Sharing Practices and the Fair Credit Reporting
Act Before the Senete Banking Comm., 108th Cong. 14 (June 26, 2003) (statement
of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/03-06hrg/062603/mierzwin.pdf.
149
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do not represent an exhaustive list and might not be the most creative
approaches available. They have been culled from existing proposals
and represent what this author views as those most likely to have a
substantial impact on the problem. They are broad proposals designed
to allow the evolution of the best solutions to ID theft, to give
consumers more control over their personal information and to
provide disincentives to the careless storage or distribution of
personal information. It should be noted that some of the proposals
most likely to reduce ID identity theft are the least likely to be passed
by the current federal government. Also, some broader proposals, if
adopted, could render others superfluous. For example, the
elimination of the SSN as the primary personal identifier for credit
granting purposes would render narrower proposals limiting the use
of SSNs moot.
Preemptions Preventing States From Attacking ID Theft Should
Be Removed
As discussed above, the FCRA as amended by the FACTA
preempts state action in many of the areas that could address the
environmental contributors to ID theft. As the federal government has
relinquished its role as the prime mover leading the charge against ID
theft, it should at least step out of the way and let states do the job.
Now is the time for the states to be the "laboratories of democracy"
envisioned so long ago by Supreme Court Justice Brandeis. As this
great Justice said in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann:
There must be power in the States and the Nation to
remold, through experimentation, our economic practices
and institutions to meet changing social and economic
needs ....

Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught

with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
experiments
laboratory; and try novel social and economic
50
without risk to the rest of the country.
There is already evidence indicating that if states are left to
their own devices, they will come up with effective measures to
protect their citizens. The FCRA preemptions began with the 1996
amendments which specifically exempted the stronger statutes in
150

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,

J.,dissenting).
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California, Massachusetts and Vermont.' 5 1 These stronger laws have
protected the citizens of those states and have not inhibited lenders
from doing business there. In 2002, Vermont and Massachusetts had
the lowest rates of consumer bankruptcy in the country, and
California was below the national median. 52The53 mortgage rates in
these states were also below the national median.1
Given the creativity of the fifty legislatures, the states are
bound to find new and better ways of protecting their citizens from
the scourge of ID theft, while still enabling lenders and credit bureaus
to operate profitability. Even now it is clear that the states have been
the leaders in attacking ID theft.194 They have been the innovators in
such areas as a consumer's right to notification of data breaches and
the ability of ID theft victims to "freeze" their credit files prohibiting
credit from being issued in their names. 155 Instead of lauding such
accomplishments, the federal government continues to try to thwart
them. With regard to data breaches, for example, the federal
government is now considering a weak bill that would not contain
a
56
private right of action and would preempt stronger state laws.'
Barring some crisis of conscience at the federal level coupled
with a well thought out national program addressing the real causes
of ID theft, the states should be left to experiment. Until such a
coherent national approach is developed, existing state law
preemptions should be repealed and no new preemptions should be
151 See

The Importance of the National Credit Reporting System to Consumers

and the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions
and Consumer Credit, 108th Cong. 3 (May 3, 2003) (statement of Professor Joel R.
Reidenberg, Fordham University School of Law ), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/050803jr.pdf.
152 Id.
153
154

Id.
See CALPIRG, Financial Privacy in the States-How Consumers Benefit

from
Person
Information
Safeguards
18
(Feb.,
2004),
http://calpirg.org/reports/financialprivacy04.pdf
155 See Roy Mark, Security: States Lead Congress on Breach Protections,
INTERNET
NEWS,
Sept.
1, 2005, http://www.intemetnews.com/security/
article.php/3531681; Amy C. Fleitas & Dani Arthur, Identity Stolen? Freeze Your
Credit Report, BANKRATE.COM, July 20, 2005, http://www.bankrate.com/
brm/news/cc/20030613 c 1.asp.
156 See Roy Mark, Business: ID Theft Bill Winds Through Senate, INTERNET
NEWS, July 28 2005, http://www.insideid.com/idtheft/article.php/3523906; Kelly
Beaucar Vlahos, ID Theft DisclosureLaw Worries Advocates, Fox NEWS, Aug. 24,
2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,166575,00.html.

2006]

Identity Theft

added.
Consumers Should Be Given Control Over Their Personal
Information Through an Opt-In System
Two statutory systems are available that give individuals
some say in the use of their personal information. One system is an
opt-in system; the other is an opt-out. Under an opt-in system, the
statute presumes that individuals do not want their personal
information provided to others without their knowing consent.
Individuals must affirmatively give permission-opt-in-to allow
their information to be transferred. The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act ("HIPPA") 157 establishes an opt-in system for
our medical information. Under an opt-out system, personal
information can be transferred unless the individual takes affirmative
action to deny such transfers.
Currently, the statutory presumption is that consumers are
perfectly happy with businesses being able to exchange, buy and sell
their non-medial personal information. With some very significant
exceptions, people are given the opportunity to opt-out of such
transfers in the case of financial institutions and CRAs. 158 Privacy
advocates argue that individuals do not particularly want their
information to be made available without their consent, and that there
159
should be an opt-in rather than opt-out system with few exceptions.
In the one case where people were given a chance to vote on this
issue, they voted for opt-in.
In 2001, citizens in North Dakota had the first and only
opportunity in the nation to take a real position at the polls
on the dissemination of their personal financial
information. The North Dakota state legislature had just
watered down financial privacy from an opt-in rule on data
sharing to an opt-out rule. The citizens of North Dakota
revolted. By an overwhelming 72% majority, the voters of
North Dakota approved a referendum restoring the old optin rule and rebuking the legislature's weakening of privacy
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104191, 110 Stat. 111936. See also United States Department of Health & Human
157

Services, Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule 9 (May 2003), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacysummary.pdf.
158 Grarm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (2000).
159

Statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, supra note 149, at 3.
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standards. Strong privacy clearly matters to 60voters and to
the health of our financial and credit system.
Given the daily reports of new data breaches and increased ID
theft, it is likely that if the people were given an opportunity to vote
on this issue today, they would strongly favor opt-in.
The personal identifiers required to commit ID theft should be
under the control of the individual. Consumers should have the right
to agree to the transfer of that information-opt in-and in the
absence of a knowing consent to its use, the information should
remain private. This opt-in approach can be made to apply to
financial institutions, CRAs and their affiliated companies by the
and
amending existing law such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 163 The protection of information in the
hands of other data brokers might need a different approach. 64
Data Brokers Should Be Regulated and Subject to Liability for
Negligent Storage or Dissemination
Data brokers-businesses that collect and sell information
including our personal information-are essentially unregulated. The
data breach at ChoicePoint, involving the theft of 145,000
individuals' personal information, is only one example of how
vulnerable our personal identifiers are in the hands data brokers. 165 If
not for a 2003 California statute requiring that victims be notified that
their personal information has been stolen, virtually all of the 145,000
individuals would never have been informed of their vulnerability to
ID theft. 166 Blindfolding potential ID theft victims from their possible
160

Reidenberg, supra note 15 1, at 4.

161 CALPRIG,

Identity
Theft
Prevention-What's
New,
http://calpirg.org/CA.asp?id2=17990&id3=CA& (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) (stating
that in California, businesses pressed strong resistance to privacy laws until faced
with the possibility of having the issue submitted to the voters).
162 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2005).
163

15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809.

164

Some proposals do involve regulating data brokers under the FCRA.

165 Center

Breaches

for Democracy and Technology, Recent Information Security
Raise
Privacy
Concerns
(Mar.
8,
2005),

http://www.cdt.org/publications/policyposts/2005/6.
166 Grant Gross, ChoicePoint'sError Sparks Talk of ID Theft Law- Privacy
Advocates Call for Federal Legislation After Company's Massive Data Leaks
Come to Light, PCWORLD, Feb. 23, 2005, http://www.pcworld.com/
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danger cannot be permitted. Data brokers throughout the country
must be required to notify victims of any breach.
Under the California law in 2005, more than sixty companies
announced breaches affecting millions of U.S. residents. 67 This rash
of data breaches has motivated nineteen states to pass breach
notification statutes.' 68 As noted above, instead of cooperating with
this effort, the federal government is attempting to protect data
brokers by considering a law which will not include a private right of
action and will preempt strong state legislation.' 69 That
obstructionism must end.
Data brokers should also be held liable when they fail to
adequately 17Xrotect or improperly disburse our personal
information. The FTC has expressed concern about the behavior of
data brokers,' 7 1 but as yet nothing has been done. If data brokers can
escape liability when they fail to take adequate steps to protect our
personal information from getting into the hands of the wrong people,
they will have little motivation to do SO. 17 2 Even the most careful of
news/article/0,aid, 119790,00.asp.
167

Grant Gross, Congress looks to Pass Data Breach Law, INFOWORLD, Sept.

2, 2005, http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/09/02/HNcongressdatal.html.
168 Id.

Robert Vamosi, CNET Reviews, Security Watch: Congress Loves Identity
Thieves, CNET.CoM, Nov. 11, 2005, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-3513_76381707-1 .html?tag=nl.e50 1.
170 See Harrington v. ChoicePoint, Inc., CV 05-1294 MRP (Sept. 13, 2005)
169

(mem.) (showing that the ChoicePoint data breach was actually a sale to criminals
who had represented themselves to be legitimate businesses. In a class action
brought against ChoicePoint on behalf of those individuals whose personal
information was sold to these criminals, a California federal district court judge
recently denied a motion to dismiss brought by ChoicePoint and held that
ChoicePoint was subject to potential liability under the FCRA). See also Steven H.
Wildstrom, Commentary, Personal Data Theft: It's Outrageous, BUSINESSWEEK

Apr.
15,
2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/apr2005/tc20050415_5345_tc 120.htm?chan=adsections&sub=exectechnol
ogy&campaign-id=knw-bp (on the potential liability of data brokers generally);
Electronic Information Privacy Center, Letter to the Federal Trade Commission
(Aug. 30, 2005), www.epic.org/privacy/iei/ftcupdate.html.
171 See Consumeraffairs.com, Data Brokers Not Without Risk, FTC Testifies
ONLINE,

(May 23, 2005), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/ftcdata.html.
172 The murder of Amy Lynn Boyer is one of the few cases where a data
broker was found liable for providing information to the wrong individual. In that
case, the information obtained was used to stalk and murder Ms. Boyer. See
Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
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data repositories might become subject to data theft given the
ingenuity of modem ID thieves and the computer experts who work
with or for them. This proposal for liability is not addressed to careful
data brokers, only careless ones. It is entirely foreseeable to data
brokers that ID thieves will attempt to buy or steal our personal
information. If data brokers adequately prepare for that threat, they
have nothing to worry about.
The Use of Social Security Numbers Should Be Restricted
The SSN is the "key" to much of the ID theft that abounds,
especially crimes involving the establishment of new accounts. This
is because the SSN is recognized as the primary personal identifier
for extending credit. 173 The development of a new, less vulnerable
credit personal identifier will take time and a great deal of thought. In
the meantime, restrictions on the use of SSNs are necessary to reduce
ID theft.
Congress has been called upon to lessen social security
number use:
If the SSN is available in fewer places, on fewer documents
and used for fewer commercial transactions or database
identifiers when it shouldn't be, identity thieves as well as
stalkers and
even terrorists will be less able to harvest it for
1 74
misuse.
Proposals on restricting the sale and use of SSNs come up
from time to time. 175 Several general principles can be derived from
these proposals. First, the trafficking in SSNs must be eliminated. It
should be against the law to transfer, buy or sell SSNs. This principle
should apply to both the public and private sector. It would apply, for
176
example, to data brokers and the CRA "credit header" exception.
For a discussion of SSNs, see Robert Ellis Smith, Social Security Numbers:
Uses and Abuses, PRIVACY J. (2002), available at http://www.simson.net/
ref/databasenation/SSNReport2001 .pdf.
174 See Mierzwinski, supra note 149.
173

See Protectingthe Privacy of Consumers' Social Security Numbers: before
the H. Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection (Sept. 28, 2004) (testimony and statement for the record of Chris J.
Hoofnagle, Associate Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center),
http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/ssntestimony9.28.04.html.
176 Letter from U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Endorsing NelsonMarkey Proposals (S 500/HR 1080) Regulating Information Brokers (Mar. 8,
171
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Those that continue to traffic in SSNs should be subject to both
criminal and civil liability. On the civil side there must be a private
right of action,177 including potential injunctive relief to prevent
similar conduct in the future.
A second way to prevent the overuse and abuse of SSNs is to
forbid businesses or government agencies from requiring individuals
to provide their social security numbers. Except for such items as
taxes, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid,179 no person should
be compelled or coerced into providing a SSN for any transaction.' 8 °
This restriction would include applications for credit, applications 8for
1
employment and requests to receive a copy of one's credit report.'
Schools and colleges are another potential source of SSNs.
Many schools use SSNs as student identifiers, and the Department of
Education reports that nationally fifty percent of student grades are
posted by SSNs. 182 Laws restricting the use of SSNs should address
this issue, especially considering the number of colleges and
universities that have been subject to data breaches.1 83 If these
restrictions on the trafficking in SSNs, the ability of businesses or
government agencies to demand SSNs and the use of SSNs by
educational institutions were enacted into law, they would have a
substantial impact of ID theft.

2005), http://www.pirg.org/consumer/pdfs/pirgendorsesnelsonmarkey.pdf.
177 Such a private right of action could be similar
to the Truth in Lending Act,
15 USC. § 1601 et seq., which provides for a minimum amount of damages,15
USC § 1640(a)(2)(A), and reasonable attorney's fees, 15 USC § 1640(a)(3).
178 Injunctive relief is essential where there is a common practice that is likely
to reoccur.
179 These areas and others, including the Department of Defense, still have
significant SSN problems. Because of the diverse nature of these areas, addressing
these problems will require different approaches. See ScienceDaily.com, Medicare,
Defense
Cards
a
Boon
to
ID
Theft,
(Sept.
19,
2005),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/upi/?feed=TopNews&article=UPI- 1-2005091720070200-bc-us-identitytheft.xml.
180 See Mierzwinski, supra note 149.
181

Id.

182

See Alex Sellinger, Students are Often the Victims ofIdentity Theft; Fraud,

CAVALIER
DAILY,
Oct.
31,
2005,
www.cavalierdaily.com/
CVArticle.asp?ID=24955&pid=1357.
183 See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 25; OhioNewsNow, supra note 25.
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Consumers Should Have Private Rights Of Action Including
Class Actions and Injunctive Relief
There are two primary methods of enforcing consumer
protection statutes. One method is by governmental agency action.
Although agency action can be very powerful, it is subject to funding
constraints and, to some extent, the philosophy of the administration
in power. 184 Even if given resources and full reign, agencies must
often reserve their intervention for the most egregious cases or those
which will have the largest impact.
The other way of enforcing consumer statutes is by
authorizing consumers subjected to a violation of a statute to sue for
its breach-by creating a private right of action in the statute. People
who prosecute such suits are called "private attorneys general"
because they act, in part, as an enforcement agent on behalf of the
government. 8 5 This can be a very effective, low-cost means of
assuring that the goals of a statute are met. At the same time, it
enables at least the one victim suing to receive compensation. Some
private right of action statutes also provide for class actions and
injunctive relief. Class actions enable the injured consumer to sue on
behalf of all consumers who have been injured by the same conduct,
and injunctive relief would prohibit the defendant from engaging in
similar conduct in the future. While consumer groups clamor for
private rights of action in statutes designed for their protection,
businesses, not surprisingly, take the opposite position.
Two of the most important statutes affecting ID theft are the
FCRA' 86 and the GLBA. i1 7 The GLBA has no private right iof9
action. 188 The FCRA has no private right of action in certain areas, 1
184

Consider

how

much

governmental

energy

went to

the Federal

Communications Commission after Janet Jackson had her "wardrobe malfunction"
at the Super Bowl in 2004.
185 See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, On What a PrivateAttorney General is And Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2129(2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfim?abstractid=743544;
Pamela S. Karlan,
Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 183, available at

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=308220; Gary M. Victor, The
Michigan Consumer as a Private Attorney General,4 COLLEAGUE 13 (1991).
186 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 etseq.
187

id.

188

id.

See National Consumer Law Center ("NCLC"), Analysis of the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/
189
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and a right of action in other areas that is so weak that it can hardly
be called a right of action. 190 Even where the FCRA provides for a
right of action, it does not provide for class actions or injunctive
relief.191
For example, consumers are now entitled to notice when 92a
financial institution is furnishing negative information about them.'
Assuming a case where no notice is given, the information furnished
was the result of ID theft and the ID theft victim suffers damages; the
ID theft victim has no right to sue the financial institution. If this
financial institution has a pattern and practice of refusing to send out
notices, even if there were a private right of action, the injured
consumer cannot sue on behalf of others injured by the practice and
cannot sue for injunctive relief ordering the financial institution to
comply with the FCRA in the future. These remedies would
93 only be
available in an action brought by a governmental agency.1
By strengthening private rights of action and by enacting
private rights of action where none currently exist, ID theft can be
reduced and victims compensated. These rights of action should
include the right to recover actual damages or a minimum statutory
amount if actual damages are less, together with reasonable
attorneys' fees.1 94 They must also include the right to pursue class
and injunctive relief. If a business is engaging in conduct that it
considers profitable even though it knows or should know that the
conduct is in violation of a statute, the downside of having to "pay
off' the few individuals that sue for the violation is not likely to deter
future violations. If, on the other hand, they realize that they can be
forced to pay all injured consumers back and/or they can be enjoined
facta/contents/nclc_analysisscontent.html#l#1 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
190 The FCRA limits liability for certain violations of the FCRA with a
qualified immunity provision that allows consumers to bring certain state law
claims only if the consumer shows that the information was furnished with "malice
or willful intent to injure" Id. This high standard substantially dilutes the right of
action in those areas.
191 There is a right of action to sue for both negligent and willful conduct. See
15 U.S.C. § 1681(o); 15 U.S.C. § 1681(n).
192 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801 et seq.
19 In fact, the FACTA created a limitation of a state's ability to sue for
damages on a class basis. In certain areas, a state must first sue for injunctive relief,
and can only sue for damages for a later violation of the injunctive order. See
NCLC, supra note 123.
194 Providing for reasonable attorneys' fees is necessary in order to induce
qualified attorneys to take such cases. This is called "fee shifting."
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from engaging in such conduct in the future, it is more likely that
they will restrain their conduct in the first place. Businesses are in
business to make profits. Only when the potential monetary losses
from ID theft promoting behavior exceed the potential profits from
that conduct, can we expect the conduct to cease.

Conclusion
We are in the midst of an ID theft crisis.' 9 5 Ten million people
were victims of ID theft in 2003 and another ten million in 2004,
resulting in losses of over $50 billion in each of those years.' 96 The
old methods of stealing identities 97 are giving way to more
sophisticated methods of data theft over the Internet. 8 Data breaches
involving the theft of over 50 million identities have taken place in
less than a year. 99 Unless the environmental factors that contribute to
ID theft are addressed, ID theft will continue to plague our society,
causing substantial economic and emotional damage.
The factors that contribute to the rise in ID theft are not
difficult to identify. Since personal information is the "lifeblood" of
ID theft, activities that make that information available to ID thieves
are essentially to blame. One primary ID theft facilitator is our
information age, which has put enormous amounts of personal
information in the hands of data brokers, financial institutions, CRAs,
retailers and other institutions-information that can be bought, sold
or stolen. Other factors include the ability of lenders to pass the cost
of ID theft on to the public, the behavior of lenders and CRAs, the
use of SSNs as the universal personal identifier, and, perhaps most
importantly, the refusal of the federal government to address the
problem in any meaningful way.
To date, there has been little federal action addressing the
environmental forces that contribute to ID theft. Thus far, business
interests have been able to thwart attempts to cure these
environmental causes. To facilitate a reduction in ID theft, the federal
government must enact new legislation and remove existing laws that
prohibit the states from experimenting with their own, unique

'95 See, e.g., Javelin, supra note 6, at 7.
196 id.
197 Id.
198 Id.

199 See Privacy Right Clearinghouse, supra note 21.
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solutions to the ID theft crisis. Proposals for changing the ID theft
environment include abolishing the preemptions in the FCRA which
prevent states from enacting stronger ID theft protections, switching
to an opt-in system enabling consumers to take charge of their
personal information, regulating data brokers so that they will be
liable for the improper storage or distribution of personal
information, restricting the trafficking in SSNs and providing private
rights of action that will allow ID theft victims to sue for damages,
class relief and injunctive relief when their rights are violated.

